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FEDERAL COMMON LAW IN ADMIRALTY:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BEGINNING OF AN EXCHANGE 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
Most scholars and practitioners of admiralty law have long relied upon two 
central assumptions regarding their subject.  First, they have understood that 
uniformity was a requisite of maritime law such that, generally speaking, 
national, rather than state, law governed most maritime events and 
transactions.  Second, they have believed that in order to preserve the 
uniformity of maritime law, federal admiralty courts are empowered to fashion 
federal common law.1  The commitment to these related propositions has been 
attested to or illustrated by a collection of Supreme Court decisions.2  For 
instance, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,3 the case that stands as the 
metaphor for the uniformity principle in admiralty, the Court said that federal 
admiralty law would displace state law which “works material prejudice to the 
characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to Tricia Fitzsimmons for her 
able research assistance and, as always, to Mary Dougherty for her patient and precise secretarial 
help.  All shortcomings are my responsibility. 
 1. See e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part 
II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 555-68 (1997) [hereinafter Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II)]. 
 2. See e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Pope 
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 
(1942). 
 3. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
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harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate 
relations.”4 
More recently, these two tenets have come under attack.  Although the 
Supreme Court has not abandoned them, several recent opinions sound the 
ominous notes of retreat.  In American Dredging Co. v. Miller,5 for instance, 
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, disparaged Jensen as “just as 
untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York . . . 
would be in a case under the Due Process Clause.”6  Comparing something to 
Lochner is a lot closer to fighting words than to a compliment.  The Court 
declined Justice Stevens’ invitation to abandon Jensen but in terms that gave 
little comfort to Jensen’s defenders.  Justice Scalia thought it “inappropriate to 
overrule Jensen in dictum, and without argument or even invitation.”7  He 
proceeded to define the “characteristic features” prong of Jensen so narrowly 
as to drain it of use.8 
Moreover, some thoughtful scholars of federal courts have recently 
challenged these suppositions as constitutionally unsound.  Professor Martin 
Redish writes, for instance, that the Supreme Court should abandon any notion 
that admiralty courts can fashion federal common law in admiralty.  The 
constitutional basis for such activity, he argues, “is subject to doubt.”9  
Professor Bradford R. Clark argues that the Jensen uniformity principle is 
“difficult to square” with the text of the Constitution and with the principle he 
finds in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins10 that Article III judicial power to decide a 
case does not confer the power to fashion federal common law.11  More 
recently, Professor Ernest Young has taken broad aim at these admiralty 
chestnuts, firing a battery of ammunition to perforate the constitutional status 
of the related uniformity and federal common law-making principles.12 
There should have been little doubt that the phenomenon of federal 
common law-making in admiralty was not only a central preoccupation of 
admiralty scholars, but was also of interest to those thinking about, and 
teaching, the subject of federal courts.  After all, leading federal courts 
casebooks include generous maritime readings on the subjects,13 and scholars 
 
 4. Id. at 216. 
 5. 510 U.S. 443 (1994). 
 6. Id. at 458. 
 7. Id. at 447 n.1. 
 8. Id. at 447-50.  I have criticized Justice Scalia’s discussion.  See Goldstein, Wilburn Best 
(Part II) supra note 1, at 588-89 and n.469. 
 9. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 140 (2d ed. 1990). 
 10. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 11. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1245, 1332 (1996). 
 12. Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1998). 
 13. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 334-35 (4th ed. 
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in the field have occasionally contributed a leading article on the subject.14  
The discussions by Professors Redish, Clark and Young made even more 
evident that the subject, far from being the proprietary right of admiralty 
scholars, is very much shared turf.  The direction of these revisionist 
discussions may have caused some consternation, even pain, among maritime 
scholars.  But the power of the assaults caused many maritime scholars to 
consider the constitutional merit of federal common law-making in admiralty, 
an enterprise, in reliance on a number of Supreme Court opinions,15 they had 
long assumed. 
In some sense, it is not surprising that some federal courts scholars would 
reach conclusions so different from their admiralty colleagues.  Those 
committed to studying the authority of federal courts naturally read a different 
literature than do maritime scholars.  Scholars of federal courts direct their 
attention to general maritime law as a species of, and to discern trends in, 
federal common law generally.  Admiralty scholars, however, focus on general 
maritime law as the source of much substantive maritime law.  The central 
issue of many courses on federal courts—-the constitutional basis, implications 
and limits of federal judicial power—-leads one naturally to consider the 
propriety of federal common law, including its prime species, general maritime 
law.  Admiralty scholars, however, focus on general maritime law largely for a 
different reason: it is the source of much of the substance of the course they 
teach.  Thus, as Professor Force points out, much of the admiralty law 
concerning collisions, personal injury, towage, general average, and salvage, is 
based upon federal judge-made law.16  For maritime scholars, federal common 
law in admiralty is simply a fact; regardless of how one weighs that fact as a 
constitutional argument, it has implications for the way commercial shipping 
works and the way maritime scholars think. 
 
1990); RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 791-801 (4th ed. 1996); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL 
COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 894-901 (4th ed. 1998); LOUISE WEINBERG, 
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND COMMENTS ON JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 83-
98 (1994). 
 14. In addition to those recently offered by Professors Redish, Clark and Young, see e.g., 
David P. Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess,” 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 
158 (1960). 
 15. See e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997); McDermott, 
Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994); East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 
Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Moragne 
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959). 
 16. Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1367 (1999). 
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Finally, the competing approaches to the subject may have something to do 
with the different way Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins17 enters the respective courses.  
In Federal Courts courses, Erie enjoys a leading role (except in those courses 
where the professor dares not retrace the path students resisted in Civil 
Procedure).  There it addresses the allocation of power between federal and 
state government, and between legislature and courts; the existence of an 
Article III grant of judicial power is insufficient to confer federal common law-
making competence.  In Admiralty courses, Erie appears as something of a 
foil, a pedagogical technique to help students understand how courts decide 
what law to apply to a particular transaction.  Cases like Jensen and Chelentis 
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co.18 established that “the general maritime law’s 
limitations on recovery prohibited the application of the state tort laws.”19  In 
essence, general maritime law displaced state law not simply in federal courts, 
but in state courts, too.  Jensen and Chelentis suggested that the substantive 
law to apply should not vary with the litigant’s choice to invoke federal or state 
jurisdiction.  As such, they stood for the same anti-forum shopping principle 
Erie announced—-and two decades earlier! 
The arguments of Professors Redish, Clark and Young also suggested that 
perhaps some dialogue among interested scholars from the admiralty and 
federal courts communities would be productive.  Although admiralty and 
federal courts scholars have navigated these common channels, they have 
rarely met midstream to share their varying perspectives.  At the 1999 meeting 
of the Association of American Law Schools, the Maritime Law Section 
sought to begin a conversation.  Its program, Federal Common Law in 
Admiralty, featured presentations by two leading maritime law scholars, 
Professor Robert Force, the Niels F. Johnson Professor of Maritime Law and 
Director of the Tulane Maritime Law Center and Professor Steven F. Friedell 
of Rutgers-Camden, and by Professor Young, now an Assistant Professor of 
Law at the University of Texas Law School, a leading new critic of general 
maritime law.  Whereas Professors Force and Friedell both are committed to 
some role for federal courts in shaping federal common law in admiralty, 
Professor Young forcefully denies the constitutionality of that exercise. 
The papers which follow consist of elaborations of the presentations 
Professors Force, Friedell and Young made to begin that conversation.  The 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL is pleased to provide these rich 
discussions that suggest some of the competing points on one of the most 
pressing contemporary issues in admiralty law. 
 
 17. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 18. 247 U.S. 372 (1918). 
 19. David Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Law After Yamaha Motor 
Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 88 (1996). 
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In addressing this issue, Professors Force, Friedell and Young draw upon 
deep understandings of their subject to offer interesting insights on many 
relevant areas of admiralty and federal courts law.  Their papers cogently 
deploy different types of constitutional arguments20 to address the question. 
Professor Young does not keep his readers in suspense regarding his 
bottom line; his title, which declares the “Unconstitutionality of Preemptive 
Federal Maritime Law,” trumpets his conclusion.  Although Professor Young 
believes that originalist arguments impeach, rather than support, the case for 
federal common law in admiralty, his argument does not lean on the framers’ 
intent.  Instead, Professor Young believes the problem stems from Jensen  
which allows maritime law to displace state law whenever admiralty 
jurisdiction exists.  Jensen represents then a relic of the rejected Swift v. 
Tyson21 era, a holdover of the general federal common law that Erie discarded.  
Professor Young’s argument proceeds from the principle of judicial federalism 
he extracts from Erie, sort of a hybrid of two of the Constitution’s central 
structural principles, federalism and the separation of powers.  Erie tells us, 
Professor Young argues, that federal “courts have no power to go first in 
making federal law.”22  The fact that the federal government may have power 
to regulate an area does not justify the federal courts in creating regulations.  
For under Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,23 “the 
separation of powers principle that only Congress makes federal law protects 
federalism as well, by channeling lawmaking decisions into the institution 
where the States are represented directly.”24  However, when federal courts 
fashion federal common law independent of any statutory authorization or 
guidance, as is often the case in admiralty, the political safeguards of 
federalism are missing.  Admiralty courts see it as their mission to provide a 
judge-made rule to address questions which Congress has not answered.  In so 
doing, Professor Young believes they violate constitutional arrangements.  The 
empty space Congress leaves in federal law should not invite federal judicial 
activity.  Rather, it signifies Congress’ inability to achieve consensus on a 
national rule, thereby implicitly leaving the matter to the states.  Current rules 
of legislative preemption recognize this principle, Professor Young suggests.  
 
 20. For discussions of different modes of constitutional argument, see PHILLIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); NORMAN REDLICH ET 
AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2-4 (2d ed.1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 
(1987). 
 21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 22. Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins and 
the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Federal Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1349, 1353 
(1999). 
 23. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 24. Young, supra note 22, at 1353. 
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They require a clear statement of Congressional intent to preempt state law.  
Yet federal common law-making activity “almost always does preempt state 
law even though Congress has never acted at all.”25 
Unlike Professor Young, Professors Friedell and Force believe that the 
Constitution empowers admiralty courts to engage in federal common law and 
that such activity is beneficial. Professor Friedell understands the current law 
to allow federal courts to fashion maritime common law except where states 
have a paramount interest.  He argues that this resolution is appropriate.  After 
canvassing various possible resolutions, essentially he invokes two types of 
constitutional arguments to justify this activity.  First, Professor Friedell relies 
on “our history that recognized a large role for the federal courts and for 
Congress to play in shipping matters.”26  Professor Friedell relies implicitly on 
two sorts of historical arguments—the substantial body of judicial doctrine that 
recognizes a role for federal courts in fashioning admiralty law and the ability 
of governmental institutions to shape constitutional meaning by engaging in a 
pattern of activity that gains acquiescence over a long enough period.  Second, 
Professor Friedell makes a prudential argument.  “I do not think this issue can 
be resolved as a matter of logic,” he  writes.27  And he is skeptical that we can 
identify “a single verbal formula” to address all issues.28  In some areas (the 
wrongful death cases, for instance), federal common law may have left a mess, 
but it is a mess that federal common law can clean up.  Moreover, Professor 
Friedell believes flexibility offers some advantage, particularly in allowing 
courts freedom to give appropriate weight to federal and state interests on an 
issue-by-issue basis. 
Like Professor Friedell, Professor Force does not believe that the logic of 
Erie is necessarily transferable to, or dispositive of, the question presented 
here.  “I start with the premise that not every controversy regarding ‘federal 
common law’ is susceptible of resolution by way of a single theory or 
formula.”29  While he gives constitutional text and history their due, he also 
believes “that practical realities of particular circumstances should be given 
some weight.”30 
Whereas Professor Friedell concentrates his defense of federal common 
law on a limited number of modes of constitutional argument, Professor Force 
deploys an array of constitutional arguments to bolster the practice.  Professor 
Force invokes originalism, citing historical evidence that the framers intended 
uniform maritime law to govern private maritime law matters.  He relies on 
 
 25. Id. at 1357. 
 26. Steven F. Friedell, The Diverse Nature of Admiralty Jurisdiction, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
1389, 1392 (1999). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Force, supra note 16, at 1377. 
 30. Id. at 1378. 
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ongoing history and judicial doctrine to bolster his position; “[t]he arguments 
for restricting the scope of the general maritime law have been considered and 
rejected for nearly two centuries.”31  Federal common law facilitates 
uniformity of maritime law, a necessity for the operation of maritime 
commerce.  Far from undermining federalism, Professor Force emphasizes 
“the various ways” maritime law “accommodates the interests of federalism.”32  
To be sure, Professor Force believes that the Supreme Court “has failed to 
develop well-calibrated rules delimiting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction 
that sufficiently balance national and local interests” and “has failed to develop 
conflicts of laws rules, which are particularly essential in cases which fall only 
marginally within federal admiralty jurisdiction.”33  In this regard, Professor 
Force joins Professor Young in subjecting “the infamous, much maligned 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen case” to heavy criticism.34  Unlike Professor 
Young, Professor Force does not see the enterprise of federal common law-
making as inherently flawed but simply mishandled on occasion by the Court 
and misunderstood more often by its critics. 
Professors Friedell and Force invoke on-going history to justify their belief 
that admiralty courts act constitutionally in fashioning federal common law.  
Professor Young does not dismiss the relevance of on-going history in shaping 
constitutional meaning.  He would be prepared to accept as persuasive the 
reliance Professors Friedell and Force place on this type of argument if he 
thought the regime the evolutionary approach created was working.  He 
concludes, however, that “maritime preemption is broke.”35  Therefore, it is 
time to return to the drawing boards, he concludes, and the new picture should 
be true to the architecture Erie sketches. 
Professors Force, Friedell and Young have offered a rich sampling of the 
range of constitutional arguments which might be marshalled on the subject.  
Their contributions here, and elsewhere, merit reading and rereading.  I cannot 
resist the temptation to depart from my neutral role as host to offer a few 
observations to the debate.  Although these introductory comments precede 
their fine papers in the pages of this Law Journal, in fact, my observations are 
prepared after their discussions and with the benefit of them.  I hope they will 
forgive me for adding these brief comments. 
I am already on record as advocating a fairly robust federal common law-
making role for admiralty courts.36  It therefore will come as no surprise that 
my own conclusions are closer to those of my admiralty brethren, Professors 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 1382. 
 33. Id. at 1384. 
 34. Force, supra note 16, at 1384. 
 35. Young, supra note 22, at 1361. 
 36. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide (Part I), 28 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 395 (1997); Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II), supra note . 
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Force and Friedell, than to my federal courts colleague, Professor Young.  
Although this is not the time or place for a full defense of the concept of 
uniformity in admiralty and the related concept of federal common law-making 
by admiralty courts, I would offer these skeletal points in addition to those 
already set forth. 
First, it seems to me that Professor Young’s effort to apply the logic of 
Erie to the maritime context encounters a formidable obstacle.  Erie may 
suggest that a jurisdictional grant does not normally serve as a basis for 
legislative or federal law-making competence.  But there is considerable 
evidence that the Court did not mean that rule to apply to admiralty.  Justice 
Brandeis, the author of Erie, had joined the Court’s opinion fourteen years 
earlier in Panama RR. Co. v. Johnson37 which construed the Article III 
jurisdictional grant to admiralty courts to confer, too, legislative power on 
Congress.  Erie based the lack of federal common law-making power in part 
on the lack of federal legislative power over diversity cases per se.  Since 
Johnson made clear that Congress had power to legislate on maritime matters, 
admiralty courts need suffer no such disability.  Moreover, during Erie’s sixty 
plus years, the Court not only has failed to apply this Erie constraint to 
admiralty but has repeatedly reiterated, by word and deed, that federal common 
law-making is routine in admiralty.  Shortly after it decided Erie, the Court 
reaffirmed its adherence to this activity in maritime matters.  In Pope & Talbot, 
Inc. v. Hawn,38 the Court ruled that general maritime law, and not state 
common law, governed a maritime personal injury claim regardless of whether 
the case was brought on admiralty, diversity or under some other basis of 
jurisdiction.  The Court’s premise in Pope v. Talbot—-that the jurisdictional 
grant in admiralty conferred federal common law-making powers—-signalled 
that the Erie limitation did not apply at sea.39  If admiralty were to operate 
under the same limitations, surely the Court would have said so. 
My second quick hit relates to Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority40  where the Court held that federal courts need not police the extent 
to which Congress could apply to the states laws that were generally applicable 
to private parties.41  Since Congress consisted of the representatives of the 
states, the political process would safeguard states’ rights.  The rationale of 
Garcia, Professor Young suggests, impeaches federal common law-making, 
which displaces state law without any political protection for the states.  I am 
glad that Professor Young shares my admiration for Garcia.  It seems odd, 
 
 37. 264 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1924). 
 38. 346 U.S. 406 (1953). 
 39. Professor Young discussed this point in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note , at 310-
12. 
 40. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 41. Id. at 546-47. 
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however, to invoke Garcia these days to vindicate federalism.  Some of those 
now in command of a five-justice federalism majority on the Court castigated 
Garcia when it was decided42 and have chipped away at it ever since then.43  I 
should have thought that few decisions were so vulnerable.  In recent years the 
Court increasingly has claimed a role in protecting the states from remedies 
conferred by generally applicable laws.44 
I would be delighted if Garcia has more vitality than I understand.  But if 
Garcia retains its vigor, I think it adds little to the argument against federal 
common law-making in admiralty; indeed, I believe it may cut the other way.  
First, the issues at stake here differ from that in Garcia.  In Garcia, the Court 
declined to find any judicially enforceable constitutional protections for the 
states from generally applicable statutes.45  Here, the issue is not whether states 
have any constitutional immunity from generally applicable commercial 
statutes, but rather whether on occasions federal common law can displace 
state law.  To the extent the issues are analogous, the political process rationale 
of Garcia essentially does operate under the current approach in maritime 
matters.  When admiralty courts fashion maritime common law, they create 
law subordinate to federal legislation.  If Congress, as the representative of the 
states, believes state prerogatives compromised, it can overturn the federal 
common law.  If Congress believes its turf has been invaded, it can respond.  
In other words, federal common law in admiralty presents a small threat to 
state law in part because Congress, the states’ protector, can always trump it.  
Just as Congress can rescind the extension to the states of a generally 
applicable law, so, too, it can reverse any federal common law rule that 
oppresses state interests. 
To be sure, there is a difference.  Outside admiralty, law does not apply to 
the states unless Congress says it does; a federal maritime common law rule 
might displace state law without legislative action.  But this difference is, I 
think, rather trivial and inconsequential.  Federal judges are not lunatics who 
cavalierly submerge treasured state interests in an ever-expanding sea of 
general maritime law.  On the contrary, they act pretty cautiously in 
promulgating federal common law in admiralty.  The amount of state law 
displaced is relatively tiny.  The practice is to accommodate important state 
interests where possible, unless outweighed by some national imperative.46  
 
 42. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting likelihood of future overruling of 
Garcia); Id. at 589 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (same). 
 43. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 119 
S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 
(1999). 
 44. See, e.g., cases cited supra note ; REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, supra note , at 67-70; Id. at 1-8 (2d ed. Supp. 1999). 
 45. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547-56. 
 46. See e.g. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-42 (1961). 
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Surely the same federal judges who strike down congressional legislation 
imposing federal duties on the states or subjecting states to remedies in federal 
or state courts can be trusted to act judiciously in fashioning federal common 
law, especially since they know their action is subject to legislative override.47 
I value slightly the displacement of state law that takes place in the real 
world of admiralty decisions.  But even if one assigns this cost greater weight, 
it still must be measured against an important structural or prudential argument 
in favor of federal common law-making in admiralty which is often 
overlooked.  In admiralty, federal courts address basic common law subjects 
that in other contexts are routinely the province of the state courts.  In 
fashioning federal common law, the Supreme Court typically displays 
sensitivity to the wisdom culled through the common law process by the state 
courts.  It often considers and distills the best of the state court treatments of a 
subject in fashioning a federal admiralty rule.48  Having done so, the rule 
announced may be binding on federal and state courts dealing with admiralty 
matters but otherwise lacks imperative force.  Still, the Court’s consideration 
of common law subjects in an admiralty context may advance the common law 
by offering the state courts non-binding examples of how an institution with 
the extraordinary human resources of the Supreme Court might treat these 
problems.  The state courts are not bound to follow the Court’s maritime 
pronouncements outside of an admiralty context, but they may do so if they are 
persuaded.  In this way a conversation occurs between the state and federal 
courts on the proper treatment of common law issues (which enriches the work 
of both).49 
To be sure, neither the Court nor the academic community can claim 
anything close to perfection in addressing admiralty matters.  But the deficit is 
often due to the difficulty of the problems, not any lack of skill of those 
addressing them.  Moreover, admiralty is not the only area where the Court, 
and those of us who study it, fall short.  On balance, the federal courts have 
contributed a great deal in their work fashioning general maritime law, both in 
solving admiralty problems and offering examples of common law reasoning.  
I tend to think the wrongful death area is less a mess than Professor Friedell 
suggests.50  But it is not near the mess that has occurred when the Court has 
 
 47. Professor Young has addressed some of these issues in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra 
note , at 333-341. 
 48. See e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) 
(relying on better common law approach; citing numerous common law decisions). 
 49. Professor Young addresses this point in Young, Preemption at Sea, supra note , at 342 
n.451. 
 50. In my view, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), was a masterful 
and wholly appropriate exercise of federal common law-making in which Justice Harlan, for a 
unanimous Court, recognized a judge-made federal wrongful death remedy.  In so doing, he 
eliminated several anomalies in maritime law consistent with congressional policies.  The misstep 
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left crucial areas of maritime activity to the vagaries of state law.  Witness the 
sorry state of the law of marine insurance resulting from the Court’s disastrous 
decision in Wilburn Boat.51 
Finally, Professor Young’s call to give Jensen “a good strong push” over 
the precipice sends me scurrying to move it to safer ground.  Although 
Professor Force prescribes a different remedy for Jensen, like Professor Young 
he is clearly not a fan or even a supporter of Jensen.  They are not alone in 
their conclusions.52  Jensen is, of course, far from perfect; who would, after all, 
expect perfection from Justice McReynolds?  The decision (denying relief via 
a state compensation statute to the family of an essentially localized decedent) 
was wrong, the analysis wooden, the language failed to soar.  Yet at the risk of 
triggering a chain of knee-slapping hilarity among Jensen’s formidable critics 
(“Did you hear what that moron Goldstein said?”), let me defend as correct 
Jensen’s two fundamental insights—-that maritime law should generally be 
uniform federal law (which implies a substantial federal common law role) and 
that the law to be applied in maritime transactions should not vary with the 
jurisdiction plaintiff invokes.  These principles have been omnipresent (even if 
not brooding) in admiralty for decades.53  Hopefully they will remain so.  To 
explain why will require a longer discussion than I can now afford in this no 
longer brief introduction to the fine work of Professors Force, Friedell and 
Young.  In any event, Jensen is the topic of the AALS maritime program in 
2000.  Tune in. 
 
occurred in Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), where the Court went beyond 
congressional policies, basically by adopting as the federal rule the evolving “better” state rule.  
Other wrongful death cases essentially adhere to congressional limits.  Other than Gaudet, the 
Court’s decision in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), is troubling in its 
distinction between seafarers and nonseafarers and some of its dicta that questions prior decisions 
setting federal standards to guide primary behavior. 
 51. See Goldstein, Wilburn Boat (Part II),supra note , at 556-58. 
 52. See e.g., GRANT GILMORE AND CHARLES BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 642 
(1975) (describing Jensen as one of two most ill-advised Supreme Court admiralty decisions); 
David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325, 332 (1995) (“The 
present era of admiralty federalism will not end until we are free from Jensen’s fading but still 
visible shadow.”). 
 53. This is not to say that strong state interests should not be accommodated where so doing 
does not interfere with some weighty federal interest.  See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 
731, 739 (1961).  Indeed, Jensen seems to allow for this. 
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